Turning the Lab into Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon. A Lab Experiment on the Transparency of Punishment
Christoph Engel ()
No 2010_06, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
The most famous element in Bentham’s theory of punishment, the Panopticon Prison, expresses his view of the two purposes of punishment, deterrence and special prevention. This paper inves-tigates Bentham’s intuition in a public goods lab experiment, by manipulating how much infor-mation on punishment experienced by others is available to would-be offenders. Compared with the tone that Jeremy Bentham set, the result is non-expected: If would-be offenders learn about contributions and punishment of others at the individual level, they contribute much less to the public project.
Keywords: Punishment; Deterrence; Special Prevention; Jeremy Bentham; Experiment; Public Good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H41 K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02, Revised 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-pbe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_06
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