Dictator Games: A Meta Study
Christoph Engel ()
No 2010_07, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Over the last 25 years, more than a hundred dictator game experiments have been published. This meta study summarizes the evidence. Exploiting the fact that most experiments had to fix parameters they did not intend to test, in multiple regression the meta study is able to assess the effect of single manipulations, controlling for a host of alternative explanatory factors. The resulting rich dataset also provides a testbed for comparing alternative specifications of the statistical model for analysing dictator game data. It shows how Tobit models (assuming that dictators would even want to take money) and hurdle models (assuming that the decision to give a positive amount is separate from the choice of amount, conditional on giving) provide additional insights.
JEL-codes: C91 D03 C24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03, Revised 2011-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Journal Article: Dictator games: a meta study (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_07
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