At the Mercy of the Prisoner Next Door. Using an Experimental Measure of Selfishness as a Criminological Tool

Thorsten Chmura (), Christoph Engel, Markus Englerth () and Thomas Pitz ()
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Markus Englerth: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Thomas Pitz: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

No 2010_27, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: Do criminals maximise money? Are criminals more or less selfish than the average subject? Can prisons apply measures that reduce the degree of selfishness of their inmates? Using a tried and tested tool from experimental economics, we cast new light on these old criminological questions. In a standard dictator game, prisoners give a substantial amount, which calls for more refined versions of utility in rational choice theories of crime. Prisoners do not give less than average subjects, not even than subjects from other closely knit communities. This speaks against the idea that people commit crimes because they are excessively selfish. Finally those who receive better marks at prison school give more, as do those who improve their marks over time. This suggests that this correctional intervention also reduces selfishness.

Keywords: experiment; Crime; Prison; Dictator Game; Hurdle Model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C34 C91 K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-law and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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