On the Prevalence of Framing Effects Across Subject-Pools in a Two- Person Cooperation Game
Sebastian Goerg () and
Gari Walkowitz ()
No 2010_28, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
In this experimental study, involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel), we test for a presentation bias in a two-person cooperation game. In the positive frame of the game, a transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player, and in the negative frame, a negative one. Subjects in Abu-Dis and Chengdu show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Helsinki and Jerusalem, no framing effect is observed. These findings are also reflected in associated first-order beliefs. We argue that comparisons across subject-pools might lead to only partially meaningful and opposed conclusions if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within (cross-cultural) research on subject-pool differences.
Keywords: framing of decision problems; methodology; subject-pool differences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C72 C91 F51 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-neu
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Journal Article: On the prevalence of framing effects across subject-pools in a two-person cooperation game (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_28
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