Effects of exclusion on social preferences

Sven Fischer (fischer@coll.mpg.de) and Werner Güth (gueth@coll.mpg.de)
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Sven Fischer: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

No 2011_34, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by him. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion affects response behavior.

Keywords: Exclusion; bargaining; ultimatum game; social preferences; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Working Paper: Effects of exclusion on social preferences (2011)
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