Fairness Spillovers – The Case of Taxation

Thomas Cornelissen (), Oliver Himmler and Tobias Koenig ()
Additional contact information
Tobias Koenig: Hannover University, Department of Economics
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tobias Steffen König

No 2012_17, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: It is standardly assumed that individuals react to perceived unfairness or norm violations in precisely the same area or relationship where the original offense has occurred. However, grievances over being exposed to injustice may have even broader consequences and also spill over to other contexts, causing non-compliant behavior there. We present evidence that such 'fairness spillovers' can incur large economic costs: A belief that there is unfairness in taxation in the sense that the rich don't pay enough taxes is associated with a twenty percent higher level of paid absenteeism from work.

Keywords: fairness; Beliefs; Taxation; Work Morale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H26 H31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2012_17online.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fairness spillovers—The case of taxation (2013)
Working Paper: Fairness Spillovers - The Case of Taxation (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_17

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marc Martin ().