Tacit Collusion – The Neglected Experimental Evidence

Christoph Engel

No 2015_04, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that "tacit collusion" or "coordinated effects" become disturbingly more likely. It seems that antitrust neglects the fact that, for more than 50 years, economists have been doing experiments on this very question. Almost any conceivable determinant of higher or lower collusion has been tested. This paper standardises the evidence by way of a meta-study, and relates experimental findings as closely as possible to antitrust doctrine.

JEL-codes: C91 D22 D43 K21 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Tacit Collusion: The Neglected Experimental Evidence (2015)
Working Paper: Tacit Collusion. The Neglected Experimental Evidence (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2015_04

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