EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Manna from Heaven for Judges– Judges’ Reaction to a Quasi-Random Reduction in Caseload

Christoph Engel and Keren Weinshall ()
Additional contact information
Keren Weinshall: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Faculty of Law

No 2020_01, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: What is the impact of caseload on judicial decision-making? Is increasing judicial staff effective in improving judicial services? To address these questions, we exploit a natural, near-randomized experiment in the Israeli judiciary. In 2012, six senior registrars were appointed in two of the six magistrate’s court districts. The choice of districts was motivated by reasons unrelated to judicial performance. In these two districts, the civil caseload per judge was substantially reduced. We find that the reduction had a significant impact on the process and outcomes of judicial decision-making. Judges working in courts with reduced caseload invested more resources in resolving each case. The effect is mostly to the advantage of plaintiffs, who were more likely to win, recover a larger fraction of their claim, and be reimbursed for litigation costs. We discuss the implications for judicial management and theories about judicial decision-making.

JEL-codes: D02 D21 D22 D83 K10 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2020_01online.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Manna from Heaven for Judges: Judges’ Reaction to a Quasi‐Random Reduction in Caseload (2020) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_01

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marc Martin ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_01