Property is Dummy Proof: An Experiment
Oren Bar-Gill () and
Christoph Engel ()
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Oren Bar-Gill: Harvard Law School
No 2020_02, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Law is for humans. Humans suffer from cognitive limitations. Legal institutions can help humans by making these limitations irrelevant. This experiment shows that strong property rights serve this function. In theory, efficient outcomes obtain even without strong property rights. In a hypothetical world where cognitive ability is perfect, individuals would not engage in wasteful taking wars. A party would not take another’s good, if she expects that the good will ultimately be taken back. By contrast, the large majority of experimental subjects takes a token good when interacting with a computer they know to maximize profit, and that has a symmetric ability to take the good back. Experience mitigates the inefficiency, but does not eliminate it; and in the real world relevant experience is often lacking. We show that cognitive limitations prevent weak property rights – imperfectly enforced property rules and liability rules with low damages – from securing efficient outcomes. Strong property rights should be preferred, because they are dummy proof.
Keywords: Property; Liability; Cost of Appropriation; Cognitive Limitations; Sophistication; Descriptive and Normative Beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D02 D47 D61 K11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_02
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