Strategie Aspects of Fighting in Alliances

Kai Konrad

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of super-modularity in alliance members' effort contributions, the role of budget constraints, the role of information transfer inside the alliance, and the role of in-group favoritism.

Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2011-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tax.mpg.de/RePEc/mpi/wpaper/Tax-MPG-RPS-2011-09.pdf Full text (original version) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:strategie_aspects_of_fighting_in_alliances

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Hans Mueller ().