Strategic aspects of fighting in alliances
Kai Konrad ()
No SP II 2011-105, Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" from Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)
This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members' effort contributions, the role of budget constraints, the role of information transfer inside the alliance, and the role of in-group favoritism.
Keywords: Alliances; contests; conflict; in-group favoritism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-gth
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Working Paper: Strategie Aspects of Fighting in Alliances (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2011105
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