Anti-social Behavior in Groups

Michal Bauer, Jana Cahlikova, Dagmara Celik Katreniak, Julie Chytilova, Lubomir Cingl and Tomas Zelinsky

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: This paper provides strong evidence supporting the long-standing speculation that decision-making in groups has a dark side, by magnifying the prevalence of anti-social behavior towards outsiders. A large-scale experiment implemented in Slovakia and Uganda (N=2,309) reveals that deciding in a group with randomly assigned peers increases the prevalence of anti-social behavior that reduces everyone’s payoff but which improves the relative position of own group. The effects are driven by the influence of a group context on individual behavior, rather than by group deliberation. The observed patterns are strikingly similar on both continents.

Keywords: antisocial behavior; aggressive competitiveness; group membership; group decision-making; group conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 C93 D01 D64 D74 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2018-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://www.tax.mpg.de/RePEc/mpi/wpaper/TAX-MPG-RPS-2018-14.pdf Full text (original version) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Anti-social Behavior in Groups (2018)
Working Paper: Anti-social Behavior in Groups (2018)
Working Paper: Anti-Social Behavior in Groups (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2018-14

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