Anti-Social Behavior in Groups

Michal Bauer, Jana Cahlíková (), Dagmara Celik Katreniak (), Julie Chytilová (), Lubomir Cingl and Tomas Zelinsky
Additional contact information
Jana Cahlíková: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Dagmara Celik Katreniak: National Research University

No 11944, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper provides strong evidence supporting the long-standing speculation that decision-making in groups has a dark side, by magnifying the prevalence of anti-social behavior towards outsiders. A large-scale experiment implemented in Slovakia and Uganda (N=2,309) reveals that deciding in a group with randomly assigned peers increases the prevalence of anti-social behavior that reduces everyone's payoff but which improves the relative position of own group. The effects are driven by the influence of a group context on individual behavior, rather than by group deliberation. The observed patterns are strikingly similar on both continents.

Keywords: aggressive competitiveness; antisocial behavior; group decision-making; group membership; group conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 C93 D01 D64 D74 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published - revised version published as 'Nastiness in Groups' in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2024, 22 (5), 2075–2107

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https://docs.iza.org/dp11944.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Anti-social Behavior in Groups (2018)
Working Paper: Anti-social Behavior in Groups (2018)
Working Paper: Anti-social Behavior in Groups (2018)
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