Unilateral Action and Negotiations about Climate Policy

Kai Konrad and Marcel Thum

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.

Keywords: mitigation; international climate agreements; bargaining; unilateral advances (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 H41 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ene and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.tax.mpg.de/RePEc/mpi/wpaper/Tax-MPG-RPS-2011-19.pdf Full text (original version) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Unilateral action and negotiations about climate policy (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:unilateral_action_and_negotiations_about_climate_policy

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