Unilateral action and negotiations about climate policy

Kai Konrad and Marcel Thum

Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.

Keywords: Mitigation; international climate agreements; bargaining; unilateral advances (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 H41 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ene and nep-env
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Unilateral Action and Negotiations about Climate Policy (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2011109

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