Optimal immigration policy when the public good is rival

Stefano Bosi, Eleni Iliopulos and Hubert Jayet

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: In this model, we characterize optimal immigration and fiscal policies in presence of a rival public good and heterogeneous discounting. Surprisingly, even if the government is benevolent towards natives only, it is optimal to keep borders open. Indeed, in the long run, patient natives hold the whole stock of capital, while impatient immigrants work. Moreover, since capital intensity is stationary, capital per native, consumption and the public good increase with the number of (immigrant) workers. This positive effect offsets the disutility deriving from the congestion of the public good. Howevern when we account for the costs associated to cultural heterogeneity, we find that it is optimal to regulate immigration inflows. We also interpret the long-run sensitivity of the optimal policy mix with respect to the fundamentals

Keywords: Heterogenous discounting; public good; immigration policy; cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 E32 H41 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mig
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2010/10095.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: OPTIMAL IMMIGRATION POLICY: WHEN THE PUBLIC GOOD IS RIVAL (2011)
Working Paper: Optimal Immigration Policy: When the Public Good is Rival (2011)
Working Paper: Optimal Immigration Policy: When the Public Good is Rival (2011)
Working Paper: Optimal Immigration Policy: When the Public Good is Rival (2011)
Working Paper: Optimal Immigration Policy When the Public Good Is Rival (2010)
Working Paper: Optimal Immigration Policy When the Public Good Is Rival (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10095

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucie Label ().