A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks

Luca Colombo (), Paola Labrecciosa () and Agnieszka Rusinowska
Additional contact information
Luca Colombo: Rennes School of Business, Rennes
Paola Labrecciosa: ESSCA School of Management (Paris Campus)

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: We take a novel approach based on differential games to the study of criminal networks. We extend the static crime network game (Ballester et al., 2006, 2010) to a dynamic setting where criminal activities negatively impact the accumulation of total wealth in the economy. We derive a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), which is unique within the class of strategies considered, and show that, unlike in the static crime network game, the vector of equilibrium crime efforts is not necessarily proportional to the vector of Bonacich centralities. Next, we conduct a comparative dynamic analysis with respect to the network size, the network density, and the marginal expected punishment, finding results in contrast with those arising in the static crime network game. We also shed light on a novel issue in the network theory literature, i.e., the existence of a voracity effect. Finally, we study the problem of identifying the optimal target in the population of criminals when the planner's objective is to minimize aggregate crime at each point in time. Our analysis shows that the key player in the dynamic and the static setting may differ, and that the key player in the dynamic setting may change over time

Keywords: differential games; Markov Perfect Equilibrium; criminal networks; Bonacich centrality; key player (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D85 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2022-02, Revised 2023-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-law, nep-mac, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-ure
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https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03601580 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks (2023)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks (2023)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:22006r

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