Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games

Vincent Iehlé

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: Different kinds of asymmetries between players can occur in core allocations; in that case the stability of the concept is questioned. One remedy consists in selecting robust core allocations. We review, in this note, results that all select core allocations in NTU games with different concepts of robustness. Within a unified approach, we deduce the existence of allocations in: the partnered core, the social stable core, the core intersected with average prekernel, the weak inner core. We use a recent contribution of Bonnisseau and Iehlé (2003) that states the existence of core allocations with a transfer rate rule equilibrium under a dependent balancedness assumption. It shall turn out to be manipulable tools for selecting the core

Keywords: Cooperative games; dependent balancedness; core selections in NTU games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2004-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2004/B04093.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games (2004)
Working Paper: Transfer Rate Rules and Core Selections in NTU Games (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b04093

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