Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games

Vincent Iehlé

Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 3, issue 42, 1-10

Abstract: Different kinds of asymmetries between players can occur in core allocations, in that case the stability of the concept is questioned. One remedy consists in selecting robust core allocations. We review, in this note, results that all select core allocations in NTU games with different concepts of robustness. Within a unified approach, we deduce the existence of allocations in: the partnered core, the social stable core, the core intersected with average prekernel, the weak inner core. We use a recent contribution of Bonnisseau and Iehle (2003) that states the existence of core allocations with a transfer rate rule equilibrium under a dependent balancedness assumption. It shall turn out to be manipulable tools for selecting the core.

JEL-codes: C6 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10-31
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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