Free-Riding and Fairness in Principal - Multi-agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence

Claude Meidinger, Jean-Louis Rulliere and Marie Claire Villeval
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Claude Meidinger: TEAM - Université Paris 1
Jean-Louis Rulliere: GATE - UMR 5824 CNRS

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: How do intrinsic motivations such as fairness and reciprocity influence the efficiency of a principal - multi-agent relationship when joint production in a team is considered? Focusing on moral hazard in teams (Holmström, 1982), this paper reports the results of an experiment designed to determine whether principal's fairness helps in reducing free-riding amongst team members. Two treatments were run, with reshuffling (stranger treatment) and without reshuffling (partner treatment). Experimental evidence shows that i)offers of fair contracts favor team cooperation in the stranger treatment, whereas ii) repeated interactions do not necessarily improve team cooperation. All results of the partner treatment point to the difficulty of establishing a fruitful cooperation between principals and team members unequally motivated by fairness considerations

Keywords: Fairness; Experimental Economics; Principal-Agent Relationship; Team Production (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D63 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2000-04
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Published in Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, 108, (4), 2000, pp. 409-434

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Related works:
Working Paper: Free-riding and Fairness in Principal-Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence (2001)
Working Paper: Free-riding and Fairness in Principal-Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence (2001)
Working Paper: Free-Riding and Fairness in Principal -Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence (2000)
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