Risk Aversion in Bargaining: an Experimental Study

J.K. Murnigham, Alvin Roth and F. Schoumaker

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: Ce Document Presente Trois Experiences Faites Pour Tester les Predictions des Principaux Modeles de la Theorie des Jeux Qui Analysent les Consequences de L'attitude Envers le Risque Sur L'issue de la Negociations. les Resultats Confirment Modestement les Predictions de Ces Modeles. Ils Suggerent Toutefois Que Pour les Montants Consideres Dans Cette Etude, les Effets de "Pole D' Attraction" Sont Plus Significatifs Que les Effets de la Riscophobie.

Keywords: Risk; Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27P. pages
Date: 1985
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Journal Article: Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An Experimental Study (1988)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:8536

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