Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
Alvin Roth () and
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1988, vol. 1, issue 1, 101-24
This paper reports the results of three experiments designed to test the predictions of the principal game-theoretic models of bargaining concerning the influence of risk aversion on bargaining outcomes. These models predict that risk aversion will be disadvantageous in bargaining except in situations in which potential agreements are lotteries with a positive probability of being worse than disagreement. The experimental results support the models' predictions. However, in the range of payoffs studied here, the effects due to risk aversion may be smaller than some of the focal point effects observed in previous experiments. Implications for further theoretical and experimental work are considered. Copyright 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33) Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Working Paper: Risk Aversion in Bargaining: an Experimental Study (1985)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:1:y:1988:i:1:p:101-24
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11166/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty is currently edited by W. Kip Viscusi
More articles in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().