The Dynamic of Cooperation in Asymmetric Dilemmas

John Murnighan, T.R. King and F. Shoumaker

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: This Paper Addresses the Difficulties of Cooperation in Asymmetric Dilemmas, Interactions Where Two Or More Parties Have Mixed Motives and Receive Different Known Outcomes If They Mutually Cooperate Or Mutually Noncooperate. Thus We Address Dilemmas That Are More General Than the More Often Studied Symmetric Dilemma. Observations From a Leverage and the Other with Potentiel Regret, and Which Reduce the Potential Benefits of Mutual Cooperation for the Party with Leverage, the Parties Alternate Asymmetrically in Receiving Valued Outcomes. These Observations Provide the Basis for a Set of Propositions That Predict When Alternation Is Most Likely and When It Is an Equilibrium Strategy. Finally We Use the Conceptual Structure of Asymmetric Dilemmas and Alternation to Analyse a Variety of Interpersonal Situations.

Keywords: Asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38P. pages
Date: 1987
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:8702

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