Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies

Francois Maniquet and Yves Sprumont ()

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

Keywords: strategy-oofness; efficiency; linear oduction set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://hdl.handle.net/1866/455 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:9805

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