Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies

Francois Maniquet and Yves Sprumont ()

Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 14, issue 3, 583-595

Abstract: In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Efficiency; Linear production set. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-10-14
Note: Received: July 10, 1997 / Revised version: November 24, 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Working Paper: Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies (1998)
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