Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions
Alessandro Riboni and
Francisco Ruge-Murcia
Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ
Abstract:
Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. In order to study whether the latter relation is causal, we construct a model of committee decision making and dissent where members' decisions are not a function of past dissents. The model is estimated using voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Stochastic simulations show that the decision-making frictions in our model help account for the predictive power of current dissents. The e ect of institutional characteristics and structural parameters on dissent rates is examined using simulations as well.
Keywords: Committees; voting models; supermajority; political economy of central banking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Dissent in monetary policy decisions (2014)
Working Paper: Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions (2011)
Working Paper: Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:06-2011
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