Dissent in monetary policy decisions

Alessandro Riboni and Francisco Ruge-Murcia

Journal of Monetary Economics, 2014, vol. 66, issue C, 137-154

Abstract: Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. This paper develops a model of consensual collective decision-making and dissent, and estimates it using individual voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Regressions based on artificial data simulated from the model show that decision-making frictions help account for the predictive power of current dissents.

Keywords: Committees; Voting models; Supermajority; Political economy of central banking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030439321400049X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions (2011)
Working Paper: Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions (2011)
Working Paper: Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:moneco:v:66:y:2014:i:c:p:137-154

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Monetary Economics is currently edited by R. G. King and C. I. Plosser

More articles in Journal of Monetary Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().