The Efficiency of Collective Bargaining in Public Schools

D.S. Hosken and David Margolis

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: This paper develops a bargaining model of wage and employment determination for the public sector. The solution to the model generates structural wage and employment equations that are estimated using data from New York State teacher-school district collective bargaining agreements.

Keywords: SCHOOLS; BARGAINING; EDUCATION; TRADE UNIONS; CONTRACTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 J50 J51 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Efficiency of Collective Bargaining in Public Schools (1998)
Working Paper: The Efficiency of Collective Bargaining in Public Schools (1998)
Working Paper: The Efficiency of Collective Bargaining in Public School (1997)
Working Paper: The Efficiency of Collective Bargaining in Public Schools (1996)
Working Paper: The Efficiency of Collective Bargaining in Public Schools (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:9609

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