The Effects of Staff-rotation in Public Administration on the Decision to Bribe or be Bribed

Miloš Fišar, Ondřej Krčál (), Rostislav Stanek and Jiří Špalek
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Ondřej Krčál: Masaryk University

MUNI ECON Working Papers from Masaryk University

Abstract: Periodic rotation of staff in public administration may lead to lower corruption, as it disrupts long-term relationships between public officials and potential bribers. This paper proposes an~experimental design that tests the~anti-corruption effect of staff rotation in situations where public officials have committed to reciprocating bribes. We find that staff rotation does not influence the~proportion of firms offering bribes but does reduce the~share of bribe acceptance and inefficient decisions owing to bribery. The~outcome of the~staff-rotation treatment, in which firms offered bribes even though they were rarely accepted by officials, is consistent with the~game having a~quantal response equilibrium

Keywords: bribery; economic experiment; anti-corruption; staff rotation; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2019-01, Revised 2023-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Public Performance & Management Review, 2021, vol. 44, pp. 404-424

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mub:wpaper:2019-01

DOI: 10.5817/WP_MUNI_ECON_2019-01

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