To pay or not to pay for parking at shopping malls - A rationale from the perspective of two-sided markets

Inga Molenda () and Gernot Sieg
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Inga Molenda: Institute of Transport Economics, Muenster

No 23, Working Papers from Institute of Transport Economics, University of Muenster

Abstract: A shopping mall is a meeting platform for retailers and their customers, and may therefore subsidize one particular market side. We consider suburban malls as competitive bottlenecks, because shops are mainly opened up by retail chains which operate in many malls, but whose customers visit only one suburban mall, so as to save transport costs. If the consumer-to-shop externality is larger than the shop-to-consumer externality, parking is subsidized. If customers generate high revenue, the mall operator will generally refrain from charging an entry fee, and offer free parking to its visitors. This result is shown in a model with variety-loving consumers and two competing malls at the end point of a Hotelling line on which their potential visitors, and thus the retailers’ customers, are located.

JEL-codes: L91 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2017-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mkt, nep-pay, nep-tre and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Forthcoming in Journal of Transport Economics and Policy

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http://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/ivm/sites/ivm/file ... e/workingpaper23.pdf First version, 2017 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: To Pay or Not to Pay for Parking at Shopping Malls: A Rationale from the Perspective of Two-sided Markets (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mut:wpaper:23

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