Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality: Evidence from the English Poor Law

Jonathan Chapman

No 20200050, Working Papers from New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science

Abstract: This paper tests whether inequality mediates the effect of democratization on government redistribution. An 1894 democratic reform to councils that provided social insurance in Britain is used as the treatment event in a difference-in-difference analysis. The reform removed institutional features- a graduated franchise, property qualifications, the absence of a secret ballot, and the participation of unelected magistrates- that helped landowners seize control of spending on poor relief after the 1832 Great Reform Act. The results support theories arguing that inequality strengthens elite opposition to democratization: more unequal districts experienced greater increases in government expenditure following the democratic reform.

Pages: 91 pages
Date: 2020-06, Revised 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-ias and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nad:wpaper:20200050

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