Mineral Resources and Conflicts in DRC: A Case of Ecological Fallacy
Giacomo De Luca (),
Jean-François Maystadt (),
Petros Sekeris () and
John Ulimwengu ()
No 1207, Working Papers from University of Namur, Department of Economics
We estimate the impact of geo-located mining concessions on the number of conflict events recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 1997 and 2007. Instrumenting the variable of interest with historical concessions interacted with changes in international prices of minerals, we unveil an ecological fallacy: Whereas concessions have no effect on the number of conflicts at the territory level (lowest administrative unit), they do foster violence at the district level (higher administrative unit). We develop and validate empirically a theoretical model where the incentives of armed groups to exploit and protect mineral resources explain our empirical findings.
Keywords: conflict; natural resources; Democratic Republic of the Congo (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q34 O13 Q32 N57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.fundp.ac.be/eco/economie/recherche/wpseries/wp/1207.pdf First version, 2012 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Mineral resources and conflicts in DRC: a case of ecological fallacy? (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nam:wpaper:1207
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of Namur, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marie-Helene Mathieu ().