Blowing the Whistle

Jose Apesteguia, Martin Dufwenberg and Reinhard Selten

No 303, Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra from Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra

Abstract: Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.

Keywords: Anti-trust; leniency; immunity; amnesty; blow the whistle; cartels; price competition; Bertrand model; experiment; communication. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2003, Revised 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Blowing the Whistle (2007)
Working Paper: Blowing the Whistle (2003)
Working Paper: Blowing the Whistle (2003)
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