Qualitative Information, Reputation, and Monopolistic Competition

Michael Darby () and John R. Lott, Jr.

No 95, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Much recent research in the economics of information has analyzed the implications of alternative market structures in the presence of qualitative characteristics which cannot be accurately and objectively measured or described. This approach avoids the more basic question of the influence of qualitative information on the emergence of market structures. This paper argues that market structures arise which minimize total average production and information costs and that qualitative characteristics produce structures utilizing reputation.

Date: 1975-07
Note: ITI
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Published as International Review of Law and Economics, vol.9, no.1, pp87-103, June 1989

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Related works:
Journal Article: Qualitative information, reputation, and monopolistic competition (1989)
Working Paper: Qualitative Information, Reputation and Monopolistic Competition (1982)
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