The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective

William Landes () and Richard Posner

No 110, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We believe that at a deeper level the independent judiciary is not only consistent with, but essential to, the interest-group theory of government. Part I of this paper explains our theory of the independent judiciary. Part II discusses several implications of the theory, relating to administrative regulation, the form of interest-group legislation, the tenure of judges, and constitutional adjudication. The appendix to this paper presents an empirical analysis of judicial independence using data on Acts of Congress that have been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

Date: 1975-10
Note: LE
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Published as Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective." Journal of Law and Economics, (December 1975).

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