Tax Rules and the Mismanagement of Monetary Policy

Martin Feldstean
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Martin S. Feldstein

No 422, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper emphasizes the importance of the interaction between tax rules and the management of monetary policy. The monetary authorities' failure to recognize the implications of the tax structure has caused them to underestimate just how expansionary monetary policy has been. Moreover, because of our fiscal structure, attempts to encourage investment by an easy-money policy have actually had an adverse impact on investment in plant and equipment. The paper discusses the desirability of substituting a policy of tight-money and positive fiscal incentives for the traditional goals of easy money and fiscal restraint. More generally, the paper stresses the significance of the fiscal structure as a determinant of macroeconomic equilibrium.

Date: 1980-01
Note: PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as Feldstein, Martin. "Tax Rules and the Mismanagement of Monetary Policy." The American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, (May 1980), pp. 182-186.

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