Wage-Employment Contracts (Replaced by W0675)
No 623, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. Under plausible assumptions, such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk. However, employment is above rather than below the efficient level when the conditions of profitability are worse than average. Such a one- period implicit contracting model cannot, therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as it is traditionally conceived.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Published as Green, Jerry and Charles M. Kahn. "Wage-Employment Contracts," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983, v98(Supp), 173-188.
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:0623
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().