Selection and Improvement: Physician Responses to Financial Incentives

Jason Barro and Nancy Beaulieu

No 10017, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this study we examine the effects of transferring physicians from a compensation system based on salary to a profit-sharing system. Consistent with theory, we find that the change has a large and significant effect on the quantity of services provided. In addition, we find a selection effect, where the least productive doctors leave the company and more productive doctors join.

JEL-codes: I1 J3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-fin and nep-hea
Note: EH
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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