Economic Insights from Internet Auctions: A Survey

Patrick Bajari and Ali Hortacsu

No 10076, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper surveys recent studies of Internet auctions. Four main areas of research are summarized. First, economists have documented strategic bidding in these markets and attempted to understand why sniping, or bidding at the last second, occurs. Second, some researchers have measured distortions from asymmetric information due, for instance, to the winner's curse. Third, we explore research about the role of reputation in online auctions. Finally, we discuss what Internet auctions have to teach us about auction design.

JEL-codes: D8 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net
Note: IO
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as Bajari, Patrick and Ali Hortacsu. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions." Journal of Economic Literature XLII (2004): 457-486.

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