Stakeholder, Transparency and Capital Structure

Andres Almazan, Javier Suarez and Sheridan Titman

No 10101, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Firms that are more highly levered are forced to raise capital more often, a process that generates information about them. Of course transparency can improve the allocation of capital. However, when the information about the firm affects the terms under which the firm transacts with its customers and employees, transparency can have an offsetting negative effect. Under relatively general conditions, good news improves these terms of trade less than bad news worsens them, implying that increased transparency can lower firm value. In addition, we show that transparency can reduce the incentives of firms and stakeholders to undertake relationship specific investments. The negative effects of transparency can lead firms to pass up positive NPV investments that require external funding and to choose more conservative capital structures that they would otherwise choose. These effects should be especially important for technology firms that require a reputation for being on the leading edge.'

JEL-codes: G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
Note: CF
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stakeholders, Transparency and Capital Structure (2004)
Working Paper: Stakeholders, Transparency and Capital Structure (2004)
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