Population and Regulation

Casey Mulligan and Andrei Shleifer

No 10234, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We present a model of efficient regulation along the lines of Demsetz (1967). In this model, setting up and running regulatory institutions takes a fixed cost, and therefore jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have them. Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U.S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history. We also find that specific types of regulation, including the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations. Overall, the data show that population is an empirically important determinant of regulation.

JEL-codes: H11 K10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-his, nep-law and nep-pbe
Note: EFG IO PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Working Paper: Population and Regulation (2003)
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