EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Why Are Most Funds Open-End? Competition and the Limits of Arbitrage

Jeremy Stein

No 10259, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The majority of asset-management intermediaries (e.g., mutual funds, hedge funds) are structured on an open-end basis, even though it appears that the open-end form can be a serious impediment to arbitrage. I argue that the equilibrium degree of open-ending in an economy can be excessive from the point of view of investors. When funds compete for investors' dollars, they may engage in a counterproductive race towards the open-end form, even though this form leaves them ill-suited to undertaking certain types of arbitrage trades. One implication of the analysis is that, even absent short-sales constraints or other frictions, economically large mispricings can coexist with rational, competitive arbitrageurs who earn small excess returns.

JEL-codes: G12 G20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-fmk and nep-rmg
Note: CF AP
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Stein, Jeremy C. "Why Are Most Funds Open-end? Competition And The Limits Of Arbitrage," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005, v120(1,Feb), 247-272.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10259.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10259

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10259

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10259