Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In

Oliver Hart and John Moore

No 10397, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We view a contract as a list of outcomes. Ex ante, the parties commit not to consider outcomes not on the list, i.e., these are ruled out'. Ex post, they freely bargain over outcomes on the list, i.e., the contract specifies no mechanism to structure their choice; in this sense outcomes on the list are not ruled in'. A loose' contract (long list) maximizes flexibility but may interfere with ex ante investment incentives. When these incentives are important enough, the parties may write a tight' contract (short list), even though this leads to ex post inefficiency.

JEL-codes: D23 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
Note: CF
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Related works:
Working Paper: AGREEING NOW TO AGREE LATER: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In (2004)
Working Paper: Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In (2004)
Working Paper: Agreeing now to agree later: contracts that rule out but do not rule in (2004)
Working Paper: Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In (2004)
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