Conscription as Regulation

Casey Mulligan and Andrei Shleifer

No 10558, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We examine the practice of military conscription around the world from the perspective of two standard theories, and a new one, which emphasizes the fixed cost of introducing and administering the draft as a deterrent to its use. We find that, holding the relative size of the military constant, higher population countries are more likely to use the draft. We also find that French legal origin countries, which we see as facing lower fixed and variable administrative costs, are more likely to draft than are common law countries. Conscription does not seem to be influenced by democracy, and is influenced by the deadweight costs of taxation only in countries with very large militaries. The results suggest that fixed costs of introducing and administering new regulations may be an important determinant of their use.

JEL-codes: D72 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
Note: LS PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published as Casey B. Mulligan, 2005. "Conscription as Regulation," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 85-111.

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Journal Article: Conscription as Regulation (2005)
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Working Paper: Conscription as Regulation (2004)
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