Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits

Lucian Bebchuk () and Jesse M. Fried

No 10742, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper analyzes an important form of "stealth compensation" provided to managers of public companies. We show how boards have been able to camouflage large amount of executive compensation through the use of retirement benefits and payments. Our study highlights the significant role that camouflage and stealth compensation play in the design of compensation arrangements. Our study also highlights the significance of whether information about compensation arrangements is not merely publicly available but also communicated in a way that is transparent and accessible to outsiders.

JEL-codes: D23 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
Note: CF LE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published as Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Jesse Fried. “Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits.” 1 Berkeley Business Law Journal (2004): 291-326.

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