Resolving the Puzzle of the Underissuance of National Bank Notes

Charles Calomiris and Joseph R. Mason

No 10951, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The puzzle of underissuance of national bank notes disappears when one disaggregates data, takes account of regulatory limits, and considers differences in opportunity costs. Banks with poor lending opportunities maximized their issuance. Other banks chose to limit issuance. Redemption costs do not explain cross-sectional variation in issuance and the observed relationship between note issuance and excess reserves is inconsistent with the redemption risk hypothesis of underissuance. National banks did not enter primarily to issue national bank notes, and a "pure arbitrage" strategy of chartering a national bank only to issue national bank notes would not have been profitable. Indeed, new entrants issued less while banks exiting were often maximum issuers. Economies of scope between note issuing and deposit banking included shared overhead costs and the ability to reduce costs of mandatory minimum reserve and capital requirements.

JEL-codes: E42 E5 G21 G28 N11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-mac
Note: DAE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Calomiris, Charles W. & Mason, Joseph R., 2008. "Resolving the puzzle of the underissuance of national bank notes," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 327-355, September.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Resolving the puzzle of the underissuance of national bank notes (2008)
Working Paper: Resolving the puzzle of the underissuance of national bank notes (2005)
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