Lobbies and Technology Diffusion

Diego Comin and Bart Hobijn

No 11022, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper explores whether lobbies slow down technology diffusion. To answer this question, we exploit the differential effect of various institutional attributes that should affect the costs of erecting barriers when the new technology has a technologically close predecessor but not otherwise. We implement this test in a unique dataset compiled by us that covers the diffusion of 20 technologies for 23 countries over the past two centuries. We find that each of the relevant institutional variables that affect the costs of erecting barriers has a significantly larger effect on the diffusion of technologies with a competing predecessor technology than when no such a technology exists. These effects are quantitatively important. Thus, we conclude that lobbies are an important barrier to technology adoption and to development.

JEL-codes: N10 O30 O57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-dev, nep-ino, nep-pol and nep-reg
Note: EFG PR
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as Diego Comin & Bart Hobijn, 2009. "Lobbies and Technology Diffusion," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(2), pages 229-244, December.

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Journal Article: Lobbies and Technology Diffusion (2009)
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