The Impact of Provider Choice on Workers' Compensation Costs and Outcomes

David Neumark, Peter S. Barth and Richard Victor

No 11855, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study how provider choice in workers' compensation cases affects costs and outcomes. When employees choose the provider, costs are higher and return-to-work outcomes are worse, while physical recovery is the same although satisfaction with medical care is higher. The higher costs and worse return-to-work outcomes associated with employee choice arise largely when employees selected a new provider, rather than a provider with whom the worker had a pre-existing relationship. The findings lend some support to recent policy changes limiting workers' ability to choose a provider with whom they do not have a prior relationship.

JEL-codes: I18 J28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-12
Note: LS
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as David Neumark & Peter S. Barth & Richard A. Victor, 2007. "The Impact of Provider Choice on Workers' Compensation Costs and Outcomes," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 61(1), pages 121-142, October.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11855.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Impact of Provider Choice on Workers' Compensation Costs and Outcomes (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11855

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11855

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().