Determinants and Consequences of Bargaining Power in Households

Leora Friedberg and Anthony Webb ()

No 12367, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A growing literature offers indirect evidence that the distribution of bargaining power within a household influences decisions made by the household. The indirect evidence links household outcomes to variables that are assumed to influence the distribution of power within the household. In this paper, we have data on whether a husband or wife in the Health and Retirement Study "has the final say" when making major decisions in a household. We use this variable to analyze determinants and some consequences of bargaining power. Our analysis overcomes endogeneity problems arising in many earlier studies and constitutes a missing link confirming the importance of household bargaining models. We find that decision-making power depends on plausible individual variables and also influences important household outcomes, with the second set of results much stronger than the first set. Current and lifetime earnings have significant but moderate effects on decision-making power. On the other hand, decision-making power has important effects on financial decisions like stock market investment and total wealth accumulation and may help explain, for example, the relatively high poverty rate among widows.

JEL-codes: D13 D14 D91 G11 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin
Note: AG
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (61)

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Working Paper: Determinants and Consequences of Bargaining Power in Households (2006)
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