Quantifying Equilibrium Network Externalities in the ACH Banking Industry
Daniel Ackerberg () and
No 12488, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
We seek to determine the causes and magnitudes of network externalities for the automated clearinghouse (ACH) electronic payments system. We construct an equilibrium model of customer and bank adoption of ACH. We structurally estimate the parameters of the model using an indirect inference procedure and panel data. The parameters are identified from exogenous variation in the adoption decisions of banks based outside the network and other factors. We find that most of the impediment to ACH adoption is from large customer fixed costs of adoption. Policies to provide moderate subsidies to customers and larger subsidies to banks for ACH adoption could increase welfare significantly.
JEL-codes: L0 L13 L86 L88 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-com, nep-fmk, nep-ict, nep-mic and nep-net
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Published as Daniel Ackerberg & Gautam Gowrisankaran, 2006. "Quantifying Equilibrium Network Externalities in the ACH Banking Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 738-761, Autumn.
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Journal Article: Quantifying equilibrium network externalities in the ACH banking industry (2006)
Working Paper: Quantifying Equilibrium Network Externalities in the ACH Banking Industry (2003)
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